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REWARDING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS: CASHING IN ON
TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
Douglas Kash *
INTRODUCTION
The criminal acts of September 11, 2001, resulted in changes to
existing United States law, including rewards available to confidential
informants who provide information on terrorists or terrorist activities.
Specifically, on October 26, 2001, the United States Congress enacted the
"Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
2001."' Prior to September 11, an informant could be eligible for a reward
under several different venues, depending upon which agency received and
utilized the informant's information. Although the events of September 11
did not increase the types of rewards, the incentives for informants,
including those who are non-citizens, were modified.
The notion of rewards for information is neither new nor limited to
terrorism. 2 Indeed, the United States Code provides for several types of
rewards for different kinds of information.3 Some examples of the more
* Douglas A. Kash, B.A., M.S., J.D., serves as a Senior Attorney with the Drug
Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. Mr. Kash's duties include
representing the United States in actions filed by confidential informants.
+ As a matter of policy, the Drug Enforcement Administration disclaims responsibility
for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed
herein are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States
Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration or any officer or entity of the
United States Government.
' Pub. L No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
2 Although some of the statutes use the term "award" it appears that "reward" is more
appropriate. Black's Law Dictionary defines "award" as "a final judgment or decision,
especially one by an arbitrator or by a jury assessing damages." "Reward," on the other
hand, is defined as a "something of value, usually money, given in return for some service or
achievement, such as recovering property or providing information that leads to the capture
of a criminal." BLACKS'S LAW DICTIONARY 132, 1321 (7th ed. 1999). For purposes of
clarity, "reward" will be used in this article unless "award" is part of the statutory language.
3 For example, 18 U.S.C. §3059B(a) (2001) authorizes the Attorney General to reward
"any individual who assists the Department of Justice in performing its functions"; 19
U.S.C. § 1619(a)(1)(B)(i) (2001) enables the Secretary of the Treasury to pay rewards for
information concerning "any fraud upon the customs revenue"; 21 U.S.C. §881(e)(2)(A)(ii)
(2001) authorizes the Attorney General to pay rewards for "information which leads to the
arrest and conviction of a person who kills or kidnaps a Federal drug law enforcement
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esoteric reward programs include: information concerning illegal
introduction, manufacture, acquisition or export of special nuclear material
or atomic weapons or conspiracies relating to this activity,4 information
leading to the discovery or missing property belonging to the Department of
Defense;5 information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons
interfering with navigational aids maintained by the Coast Guard and
discovery of missing Coast Guard property;6 information leading to the
arrest and conviction of persons responsible for forest fires in the national
forests;7 information leading to a civil penalty or criminal conviction for
violations of the African Elephant Conservation Act;8 and information
leading to the arrest of any person who is charged with a violation of a
criminal law of the United States.
9
This article focuses on a few of the different reward mechanisms for
information relating to acts of terrorism and narcotics trafficking and
explains the process of each program. While several U.S. intelligence
agencies (civilian and military) have internally managed reward programs
for confidential informants, these programs and their appropriations are
classified for national security purposes and will therefore not be addressed
in this article. Additionally, since most law enforcement agencies have
their own reward programs, this article will focus on the reward programs
of the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the
Department of State.
10
agent"; 26 U.S.C. §7623 (2001) authorizes the Secretary of Treasury to pay rewards for
"detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal
revenue laws or conniving at the same"; and 28 U.S.C. §524(c)(1)(C) (2001) authorizes the
Attorney General to reward those who provide "information or assistance leading to a civil
or criminal forfeiture."
4 50 U.S.C. §47a (2001).
' 10 U.S.C. §2252 (2001).
6 14 U.S.C. §643 (2001).
7 16 U.S.C. §559a (2001).
8 16 U.S.C. §4225(a) (2001).
9 18 U.S.C. §3059(a)(1) (2001).
10 Examples of reward programs for agencies other than the Department of Justice
include the Secretary of the Treasury informant reward authority, found at 31 U.S.C. §5323
(2001), and the U.S. Customs Service award of compensation to informers, found in the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1619 (2001).
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I. REWARD MECHANISMS
A. The Confidential Informant Reward Program for Terrorist
Information
Rewards for information involving terrorism were established by the
1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism (1984 ACIT).1" Under the
1984 ACIT, the Attorney General is given discretionary power with respect
to acts of terrorism to reward any individual who furnishes information-
(1) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any country, of any
individual or individuals for the commission of an act of
terrorism against a United States person or United States
property; or
(2) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any country, of any
individual or individuals for conspiring or attempting to
commit an act of terrorism against a United States person
or property; or
(3) leading to the prevention, frustration, or favorable
resolution of an act of terrorism against a United States
person or property.12
Excluding government employees acting within the scope of their
official duties, an individual may be entitled to a reward up to $500,000.
Rewards up to $100,000 can be paid with the approval of the Attorney
General, while a reward of $100,000 or more requires the personal approval
of the President or Attorney General. The rewards are deemed conclusive
and no court has the power or jurisdiction to review it.13 Additionally,
although the identity of an informant is kept strictly classified, informants
and their immediate families are eligible to participate in the Attorney
General's Witness Protection Program.
When President Ronald Reagan sent the ACIT bill to Congress in
April 1984, he noted the limitations of existing laws, specifically the lack of
authority to pay rewards for information concerning acts of terrorism
1 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Pub. L No. 98-533, 98 Stat. 2706 (1984)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §3071-77 (2002)).
12 Id. The 1984 ACIT was amended in 1994 to include acts of espionage and to replace
the heading to Chapter 204 from "Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts" to
"Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts and Espionage." See Pub. L. No. 103-
359, title VIII, §803(a), 108 Stat. 3438 (1994).
13 18 U.S.C. §3072 (2001).
14 Id. §3076.
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abroad.'5 President Reagan also stated that the payment for rewards in
connection with domestic acts of terrorism was appropriately designated to
the Attorney General while acts of terrorism outside of the territorial United
States raised political and foreign relations issues within the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of State.' 6 Upon signing the bill into law, President Reagan
proclaimed that this law would "provide the resources and authorities
essential in countering the insidious threat terrorism poses to those who
cherish freedom and democracy .... This Nation bears global responsibilities
that demand that we maintain a worldwide presence and not succumb to
these cowardly attempts at intimidation."
' 17
The 1984 ACIT adopted the definition of "terrorism" from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act,' 8 defining terrorism as violent or dangerous
acts that would be crimes if committed in the United States and that appear
to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence
the policy or conduct of a government or political subdivision of a
government by intimidation or coercion. The 1984 ACIT was first used in
1985 in connection with the slayings of four U.S. Marines and two U.S.
civilians in El Salvador.
Current law, specifically the "Rewards for Information Concerning
Terrorist Acts and Espionage," utilizes the same definition for terrorism as
the 1984 ACIT. '9 Rewards are still deemed conclusive and no court has
the power or jurisdiction to review the reward. Again, informants'
identities can be kept strictly classified, and their immediate families are
eligible to participate in the Attorney General's Witness Protection
Program.2°
The recently enacted USA PATRIOT Act amended the reward
program's authority by increasing the amount of money offered or paid to
an informant. Now, a reward totaling $250,000 or more requires the
personal approval of the President or Attorney General. 2' The USA
PATRIOT Act also mandates that if a reward is approved under this
section, the Attorney General must transmit written notice to the Chairmen
and ranking minority members of the Appropriations and the Judiciary
Committees in the Senate and House of Representatives no later than 30
15 President's Message to Congress Transmitting Four Proposed Bills on International
Terrorism, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 590 (Apr. 26, 1984).
16 id.
17 President's Statement on Signing H.R. 6311 into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC.
1573 (Oct. 19, 1984).
'8 50 U.S.C. §1801(c)(1) and (2) (2001).
'9 18 U.S.C. §3077(l)(2001).
20 See id. §3076.
2 USA PATRIOT Act §501(b)(1) (2001).
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days after the approval.22 The funding for the reward program can come
from any executive agency or military department. The Attorney General's
23refusal to make a reward is not subject to judicial review.
B. The "S Visa"
In addition to the monetary reward incentive, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), a component agency of the Department of
Justice, has the authority under specific limited circumstances to grant
special visas to non-immigrants and their immediate families. On
November 29, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced a new
program, the "Responsible Cooperators Program" which provides
incentives to aliens to provide useful information about terrorists and their
activities.24 The incentives already existed within the U.S. Code, but this
program is an effort to reinvigorate cooperative communication between
the Department of State and alien groups regarding any knowledge their
members may have regarding criminal acts, particularly terrorism.25
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 created
a new immigration regulation establishing an "S" visa (sometimes referred
to as the "Snitch visa") which provides for a temporary and potentially
permanent stay within the U.S.2y There are two categories of the S visa:
The S-1 visa is issued to aliens who possess "critical reliable information"
regarding criminal activity who are willing to share their information with a
U.S. agency or court and whose presence in the U.S. is necessary for the
successful prosecution of the criminal activity. 27 The S-2 visa is available
to aliens possessing "critical reliable information" regarding terrorist
activity.28 In addition to the cooperation under S-1, the S-2 informant must
be in danger as a result of providing the information to the U.S. Only state
and federal law enforcement authorities (including federal or state courts
and U.S. Attorneys) can initiate a request under the "S" category.29 The
22 Id. §501(b)(2).
23 Id. §501(b)(3)-(4).
24 Dan Eggen, U.S. Dangles Citizenship to Entice "Cooperators," THE WASHINGTON
POST, Nov. 30, 2001, at Al.
25 id.
26 Immigration and Nationality Act §101(a)(15)(S) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(S)
(1994). See also Immigration and Nationality Act §212(d) (1994) (allowing Attorney
General to waive inadmissibility with respect to a nonimmigrant as set forth in
§10!(a)(15)(S) if the Attorney General considers it to be in the national interest).
27 Id. (emphasis added).
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 8 C.F.R. §214.2(t)(2). The application is made on INS form 1-854 accompanied by an
1-539. Id.
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alien must be eligible for a reward under 22 U.S.C. §2708(a) also
designated as section 36(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act
of 1956.30 The application must contain evidence establishing the nature of
the alien's cooperation with the government, the need for the alien's
presence in the U.S., all conduct and conditions which may constitute
grounds for exclusion, and all factors and considerations warranting
favorable consideration by the Attorney General on the alien's behalf.
3
'
The request must be submitted to the Assistant Attorney General
(AAG), Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice. When necessary,
the AAG can empanel personnel from the U.S. Marshals Service, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of
Justice Criminal Division, and Department of State to review the
applications and prioritize the cases in order to conform to the statutorily-
mandated numerical limitations.32 The application is then forwarded to the
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for final
approval. 33 Within their three-year stay, aliens can apply for permanent
resident status ("green card") which may ultimately result in citizenship.
C. The Reward for Justice Program
The Department of State also has the authority to pay rewards for
information on terrorism. The Department of State was authorized to
establish a rewards program in the Omnibus and Diplomatic Security Act of
1986, funded from the moneys available under section 36(a) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956.34 Similar to the Attorney
General, the Secretary of State has the authority to pay a reward to any
individual who furnishes information leading to -
(1) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual for the commission of an act of international
terrorism against a United States person or United
States property;
(2) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual conspiring or attempting to commit an act of
international terrorism against a United States person
or United States property;...
30 22 U.S.C. §2708 (2001) (amended by Chapter 502 in the USA PATRIOT Act). See
also State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 §36, Pub. L. No. 885, 70 Stat. 890
(1956) (as amended by The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4181 (1988), and the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-231, 103
Stat. 1954 (1989).
3' 8 C.F.R. §214.2(t)(4)(i)(C).
32 Id. §214.2(t)(4)(ii)(B).
33 Pd. §214.2(t)(4).
14 Pub. L No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (1986) (codified throughout the U.S. Code).
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(4) the arrest or conviction in any country of any
individual aiding or abetting in the commission of an
act described in paragraph (1) [or] (2)...
(5) the prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of
an act described in paragraph (1) [or] (2), including by
dismantling an organization in whole or significant
part; or
(6) the identification or location of an individual who
holds a key leadership position in a terrorist
organization.
35
The USA PATRIOT Act also amended the maximum amount of a
reward under 22 U.S.C. §2708(e)(1) which now provides "No reward under
this section shall exceed $5,000,000, except as personally authorized by the
Secretary of State if he determines that offer or payment of an award of a
larger amount is necessary to combat terrorism or defend the Nation
against terrorist acts."36  The USA PATRIOT Act appears to give the
Secretary of State the discretion to offer a reward without a monetary
limit.3
7
In an effort to avoid duplication or interference with the payment of
informants or obtaining evidence or information, the Secretary of State
shall consult with the Attorney General regarding-
(A) [the identification of] individuals, organizations, and offenses
with respect to which rewards will be offered;
(B) the publication of rewards;
(C) the offering of joint rewards with foreign governments;
(D) the receipt and analysis of data; and
(E) the payment and approval of payment.38
However, before making a reward payment for any matter over which
there is Federal criminal jurisdiction, the Secretary of State must secure the
approval of the Attorney General.39
" Id. (USA PATRIOT Act amendments in the italics).
36 USA PATRIOT Act amendment in italics. It is noteworthy that the U.S. House of
Representatives passed a resolution amending 22 U.S.C. §2708 by increasing, yet limiting,
the Secretary's award authority to $25,000,000. See H.R. REP. No. 236(I), to accompany
H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. (2001).
37 See BLACKS'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
3' 22 U.S.C. §2708 (c)(1) (2001).
'9 Id. §2708(c)(2).
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Since the days of the "Wanted" posters, new methods and
technologies have contributed to the fight against terrorism. The
Department of State, in coordination with several media outlets and other
private entities, has repeatedly broadcast ways in which the public can
assist the government. The Rewards for Justice Program was created in
1984 and is managed by the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), a
component of the Department of State. The Director of the DSS chairs an
interagency committee that reviews reward candidates and makes
recommendations to the Secretary of State. Depending upon the type of
incident, the committee can include representatives from the National
Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.
Marshals Service Witness Security program, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Federal Aviation Administration, and Department
of Energy.n°
Any individual can furnish confidential information via mail,
telephone or the internet.4n Individuals that do not have any information to
offer can contribute money to the Rewards for Justice Fund through
www.RewardsFund.org& a 501(c)(3) nonprofit charitable fund from which
the rewards are paid. 2
RewardsFund.org was created on December 13, 2001, by Steve Case
and Joe Rutledge, two businessmen who were moved to lend their business
and advertising expertise after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In
coordination with the State Department's campaign undertaken by Under
Secretary of State Cheryl Beers, Case and Rutledge also advised the State
Department to create the toll-free line. At least four states, Virginia, South
Carolina, Connecticut and Florida have introduced legislation for the
creation of "United We Stand" license plates. The proceeds from the sales
of the license plates will go to the Rewards Fund.43
The availability of rewards has been published in domestic
newspapers such as The New York Times, and internationally in Al Hayat,
Paris Match, Die Welt, and Pravda. These announcements comport with
the statutory mandate, referred to as the Aviation Security Improvement
Act of 1990," requiring the Secretary of State to publish the availability of
U.S. rewards for information on international terrorist-related activities,
40 Information about the Rewards for Justice program is available to the public on the
world wide web. See http://www.rewardsforjustice.net (last visited May 5, 2002).
41 Information is communicated through the website, by telephone (1-800-
USREWARDS), or by mail (Rewards for Justice, P.O. Box 96781, Washington, DC 20522-
0303).
42 See http://www.RewardsFund.org; see I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
43 id.
44 22 U.S.C. §§5501-5513 (2001).
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which to the appropriate extent, are prominently displayed domestically and
abroad in international airports.45
Secretary of State Colin Powell called the Rewards for Justice
Program "an extremely effective weapon in the United States' arsenal to
combat terrorism., 46  David Carpenter, Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security, added that the reward program has saved thousands of
lives by preempting terrorist attacks. He noted that 22 people have received
a total of more than $8 million [over the past seventeen years] in exchange
for confidential information. The program generated information that led to
the arrest of Ramzi Yousef who was convicted for the World Trade Center
bombing in 1993.47 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated
that the Rewards for Justice Program has resulted in more than 100
telephone calls, 600 letters, 1,200 e-mails and 1.2 million hits on the
website.48 One of the most recent rewards offered was for information
leading to the arrest and conviction of the persons responsible for the
kidnapping and murder of The Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl.
On February 27, 2002, the Department of State offered $5,000,000 for the
information. 9
Moreover, in 1990 the Air Transport Association of America (ATAA)
and the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) agreed to
supplement the rewards paid by the U.S. Government for information that
prevents a terrorist act against U.S. civil aviation or leads to the arrest or
conviction of any person who has committed such an act.50 Although not a
separate fund, this enables the ATAA and ALPA to increase a reward by up
to $2 million.
D. Confidential Informant Reward Programs for Narcotics-
Related Information
Today's investigators, particularly those involved in drug trafficking,
rely on confidential sources of information (CS) to infiltrate criminal
organizations to help build their cases. From the first day of training and
throughout their careers, investigators are repeatedly instructed not to make
41 Id. §5512(c).
46 Tim Johnson, Ads Stress $25 Million U.S. Kitty For Informants, MIAMI HERALD, Dec.
14, 2001, at 37A.
47 id.
48 CNN.com, Cash Offered, New Strategy Pushed in U.S. Fight to Foil Terrorism, (Dec.
14, 2000), at http://fyi.cnn.com/2000/US/12/14/terrorism.report.02 (last visited May 6,
2002).
49 See Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, Rewards for Justice Program: Reward
Offered for Information Leading to Arrest or Conviction in Daniel Pearl Murder Case (Feb.
27, 2002) available at http:/www.state.govrpa/prs/ps1200218544.htm.
50 Website, supra note 40.
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promises to CSs. For example, pursuant to the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) Agents Manual, agents are specifically prohibited
from promising informants rewards in any amount. This is especially
important when the issue is a reward for the information provided to the
investigator. DEA Special Agents and Task Force Officers have utilized
thousands of CSs who have been justly compensated for their efforts. In a
limited number of cases, a CS has objected to the amount of a reward he
received and filed a civil action against the DEA for a breach of contract
seeking a reward of compensatory damages arguing that he was "promised"
or is "entitled" to a definitive dollar amount or a specific percentage of the
assets seized. Notwithstanding this assertion, a CS is not entitled to any
reward nor can he legally rely on any purported promises made by
investigators.
The statutory authority for CS rewards from the Department of Justice
is found in two distinct code sections. The first is 21 U.S.C. §886, which
authorizes the Attorney General to pay any person from funds appropriated
to the DEA for information concerning a violation of the Controlled
Substances Act without regard to any reward the person may otherwise
receive.
52
The second source is found at 28 U.S.C. §524(c)(1) which provides
that the Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF) "shall be available to the Attorney
General without fiscal year limitations for [specified] law enforcement
purposes." By its very language, granting a reward is discretionary and the
statute neither enumerates any specific requirements nor stipulates a certain
sum. Consequently, §524(c) does not mandate that a CS is entitled to
monetary remuneration.53
Section 524(c) provides for a reward under two subsections. Section
524(c)(1)(B) allows for the payment of rewards for information or
assistance directly relating to violations of the criminal drug laws. Section
524(c)(1)(C) grants the Attorney General discretionary authority to pay a
51 Drug Enforcement Administration Agents Manual §6612.57(A)(1).
"Do not make any commitments to a CS regarding payment form [the
Asset Forfeiture Fund]. CSs have no inherent "entitlement" to receive
payment from the Asset Forfeiture Fund regardless of the extent of their
cooperation. The final decision as to whether to pay a CS from the Asset
Forfeiture Fund is at the discretion of the appropriate Headquarters
officials...."
52 21 U.S.C. § 801.
53 Hoch v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 39, 45 (1995). See also Henke v. United States, 43
Fed. Cl. 15, 28 (1999)(noting that decisions to make awards of $250,000 or more under 28
U.S.C. §524(c) are "wholly discretionary").
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reward for information or assistance leading to a civil or criminal forfeiture.
The Hoch court opined that:
When an informant provides information or assistance under section
524(c)(1)(B), the Attorney General or her delegate has discretion to
award any amount between $0.00 and $250,000.00. Similarly when an
informant provides information or assistance under section 524(c)(1)(C),
the Attorney General or her delegate has discretion to award any amount
between $0.00 and $250,000.00, or between zero and 25 percent of the
amount realized from the property forfeited, whichever is less. Neither
section 524(c)(1)(B) nor section 524(c)(1)(C) requires payment of any
particular sum; instead the statute leaves the amount of the award to the
discretion of the Attorney general or her delegate.
The Federal Circuit has determined that 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) authorizes
the discretionary payment of rewards from the proceeds of forfeited
property but does not mandate the payment of compensation from the
government.54 The DEA has adopted internal regulations, set forth in the
DEA Agents Manual, which detail the purely discretionary nature of the
payment of rewards, and the officials who are required to approve these
rewards at the highest levels of the DEA.
Where the payment of rewards is contingent on the quality of the
information provided, it is not integral to an agents' duties that he be able to
contract with informants at the beginning of the informant relationship as
former CS plaintiffs typically allege. Agents are specifically prohibited
from making promises to a CS and conduct that violates that prohibition
cannot be said to be integral to the agents' duties.55 The final decision as to
whether to pay a CS from the AFF is purely at the discretion of the
appropriate DEA Headquarters officials and depends upon other priorities.56
Consequently, DEA Special Agents and deputized Task Force Officers are
continually reminded that they are not to make any promises or firm
commitments to a (potential) CS creating the impression that the CS is
"entitled" to any remuneration. If the agent were to do so, she would be
acting outside the scope of her authority and would be subjected to the
disciplinary consequences of her actions.
D. The Department of State Narcotics Reward Program
The United States Department of State has its own rewards program
for information relating to narcotics trafficking. The Department of State's
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
54 Id. See also Perri v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 627, 629-30 (1996).
55 This policy has also been recognized by the federal courts. See Cruz-Pagan v. United
States, 35 Fed. Cl. 59 (1996).
56 See DEA Agents Manual, supra note 51.
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manages the narcotics part of the rewards program with the funding from
their Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Services (EDCS)
appropriation. In turn, INL coordinates this program closely with the DEA
and other law enforcement agencies.57
Initially established to dismantle the Medellin cocaine cartel in
Colombia, and later the Cali cartel, the program was later extended to
include ongoing investigations in other parts of the hemisphere such as the
Mexican drug cartels.5  The scope of the program was broadened to
include Asian heroin cartels as a result of Presidential Decision Directive
44.59 One critical difference between this reward program and the Rewards
for Justice program, which is aimed at preventing acts of international
terrorism, is that INL does not have any contact with informants. Managing
informants is left to the agents and investigators responsible for the
investigation.
Reward proposals are generally submitted by a U.S. embassy chief of
mission to the Department of State upon the recommendation of a law
enforcement agency such as the DEA. The proposals are then reviewed by
the Interagency Narcotics Reward Committee which is chaired by the INL
Assistant Secretary of State.60 The statutory authority for these rewards is
found at the same authority for terrorism rewards; Section 36 of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956. Specifically, the purpose of this
act is not only to assist the Department of State in obtaining information
that helps prevent acts of international terrorism, but also "to assist in the
prevention of acts of... international narcotics trafficking...' Pursuant to
this authority, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney
General, may pay a reward to anyone other than a domestic or foreign
government employee who furnishes such information in the performance
of his or her official duties leading to...
(3) the arrest or conviction in any country of any individual
for committing, primarily outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, any narcotics-related
offense if that offense involves or is a significant part of
conduct that involves-
57 The INL's approved 2002 budget provides for spending on its partnership with the
DEA. See Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Policy, Summary:
FY 2002 National Drug Control Budget April 2000, available at http://www.
whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/index.html.
58 See U.S. Department of State, Narcotic Rewards Program at http://www.state.gov/gl
inl.
59 A Presidential Decision Directive directs Executive Branch departments and agencies
to assume a standard policy promulgated by the President.
60 See The Foreign Affairs Manual, Vol. 2 FAM 951.
61 22 U.S.C. §2708(a)(2) (2001).
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(A) a violation of U.S. narcotics laws such that the individual
would be a major violator of such laws;
(B) the killing or kidnapping of-
(i) any officer, employee, or contract employee of
the United States while such individual is
engaged in official duties, or on account of
that individual's official duties, in connection
with the enforcement of the United States
narcotics laws or the implementing of United
States narcotics control objectives; or
(ii) a member of the immediate family of any such
individual on account of that individual's
official duties, in connection with the
enforcement of United States narcotics laws or
the implementing of United States narcotics
control objectives; or
(C) an attempt or conspiracy to commit any act described
in subparagraph (A) or (B);
(4) the arrest or conviction in any country of any individual
aiding or abetting in the commission of an act described
in paragraph... (3);
(5) the prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of an
act described in paragraph... (3).62
While the USA. PATRIOT Act amended the amount of a reward for
terrorism cases, it did not do so for narcotics-related investigations and,
consequently, the reward amount is capped at $5,000,000.00.63 Since 1989,
the Department of State has paid informants a total of more than $6,000,000
for information which has led to the arrest or conviction of major drug
traffickers 
64
One of the most critical components of this program, as well as the
others mentioned in this article, is the extent to which agencies will go to
ensure the complete confidentiality of informants. Indeed, confidentiality is
integral to the survival of this program (and all other informant programs)
without which a person would likely not agree to provide sensitive and
possibly life-threatening information. Relocation of informants and their
families, providing new identities and new jobs are some of the options
utilized to protect informants. In a limited number of cases, providing
62 Id. §2708(b)(3)-(5).
61 Id. §2708(e)(1).
64 CNN.com, supra note 48.
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informants these considerations "backfires" on the government such as the
case of Sammy "The Bull" Gravano, a former New York organized crime
figure who after admitting to the murder of 19 people, cooperated with law
enforcement in its case against New York organized crime families,
resulting in the conviction of 36 organized crime members. Gravano was
placed into the federal Witness Protection Program, underwent plastic
surgery, and relocated to Arizona where he assumed a new identity. In
February 2000, Gravano was arrested and charged by the Arizona Attorney
General with racketeering, conspiracy and money laundering for his alleged
drug trafficking activities in Arizona "rave clubs."
CONCLUSION
Based upon the aforementioned statutes, there are sufficient tools
through which confidential informants can be rewarded for their
information regarding terrorism and illicit narcotics trafficking. With
respect to terrorism, the USA PATRIOT Act empowers the President and
Attorney General to approve rewards. The Secretary of State has the
apparent authority to offer rewards, without a monetary limit, to provide an
incentive to persons with information sought by the United States. Some of
those who possess the information have such deeply held religious or
political convictions that no amount of money would cause them to contact
U.S. authorities. Consequently, the U.S. intelligence community continues
to develop its information gathering techniques and recruit sources who,
notwithstanding their religious or political affiliations, are willing to
provide confidential information in an effort to prevent attacks on those
who cherish freedom and provide for its security.
Similarly, the scourge of drugs and the baneful nature of the traffickers
continue to reap death and destruction on the United States. In order to
target those most responsible for importing their poison onto the streets of
America, investigators must sometimes rely on informants who have the
ability to infiltrate narcotics trafficking organizations and integrate
themselves into the organizations' operations. Monetary rewards, unlike
reduction of charges and/or punitive sentences, can provide the incentive to
persons who are not facing charges to provide necessary intelligence. Once
successful, investigators can interdict the drugs, arrest the offenders and
enable prosecutors to bring criminal charges thereby mutating suspects into
defendants.
The arrest and conviction of suspected terrorists and drug traffickers is
but one barometer in gauging the value of informants and the wisdom of
monetary reward programs... more importantly is the number of deaths
prevented. After all, it makes infinitely more sense to pay the price of a
reward than the price of another September 11 th.
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